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I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Sandra Sperino’s article, Let’s Pretend Discrimination Is a
Tort,1 makes a valuable contribution to the debate about the proper
interpretation of Title VII and other employment discrimination laws in light
of Supreme Court trends. Professor Sperino ably describes the way that the
Supreme Court has used tort concepts increasingly in recent cases, 2 even
having gone so far as to have called employment discrimination statutes
federal torts.3 This development has created significant concern among
scholars,4 including Professor Sperino herself.5
Rather than simply reiterate those concerns, however, in her article
Professor Sperino adopts a novel approach: she takes the Court at its word,
spinning out how embracing tort concepts and tort methodology would
transform discrimination law. 6 In sum, she explores how using tort concepts
 Professor of Law and Director, William C. Wefel Center for Employment Law.
1 Sandra F. Sperino, Let’s Pretend Discrimination Is a Tort, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1107

(2014).
2 Id. at 1107.
3 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011).
4 See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L.

REV. 1431, 1459 (2012); Cheryl Krause Zemelman, Note, The After-Acquired Evidence
Defense to Employment Discrimination Claims: The Privatization of Title VII and the
Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L. REV. 175, 193−97 (1993).
5 See generally Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and
Proximate Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1; Sandra F. Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause,
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1199 (2013); Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort Label, 66 FLA. L. REV.
1051 (2014).
6 See generally Sperino, supra note 1.
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could “clarify the roles of intent and causation in discrimination analysis,
[should] alter the way courts conceive intent, [should] lower the harm
threshold for some sexual harassment cases,”7 and would transform current
approaches to statutory interpretation, allowing the law greater “flexibility to
respond to changing circumstances.”8 This response essay applauds Professor
Sperino’s work in this area, her suggestion of a silver lining in a problematic
trend, and the roadmap she lays out for a more positive trajectory. At the same
time, I worry that she is unlikely to succeed because the actors she relies upon
to effect the changes she projects are unwilling to do so.

II. THE LARGE CONSENSUS THAT DISCRIMINATION LAWS ARE ENFORCED
TOO NARROWLY
The path Professor Sperino lays out for the lower courts on what it would
really mean for discrimination to be a tort is appealing to scholars concerned
about the way that the federal courts have appeared to have been consistently
narrowing the reach of employment discrimination statutes. Extensive research
has shown that employment discrimination plaintiffs fare significantly worse
in federal court at every possible stage of litigation than plaintiffs in other
kinds of cases. For example, few employment discrimination cases go to trial. 9
When they do go to trial, few cases are resolved in favor of employees once
the appeals process is exhausted.10
And it is not only scholars who are concerned about the way the Supreme
Court in particular has narrowed the law. Congress has acted several times to
amend the discrimination statutes to “fix” them after the Court issued
decisions that narrowed their scope. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act
amended Title VII to effectively overrule the Supreme Court’s decision in
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy
7 Id. at 1107.
8 Id. at 1109.
9 See Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment

Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 120 (1999) (suggesting that only ten percent of
employment discrimination cases go to trial); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab,
How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 429, 440−41, 444 (2004) (stating that nearly seventy percent of employment
discrimination cases settle and plaintiffs win only just over four percent of pretrial
adjudications).
10 See Kevin M. Clermont et al., How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 547, 551−54 (2003) (finding
that cases decided in favor of plaintiffs are six times more likely to be reversed than those
found in favor of defendants); Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The
Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 283−84, 309 (1997) (arguing that
meritorious cases are lost or reversed on appeal); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment
Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 560−61 (2001) (asserting that
employers prevail in ninety-eight percent of federal court employment discrimination cases
resolved at the pretrial stage).
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was not discrimination on the basis of sex.11 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was
enacted in part because “the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio . . . has weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal
civil rights protections.”12 It also added a provision that gave Title VII and the
ADA limited extraterritorial reach after the Court had held in EEOC v.
Arabian American Oil Co. that Title VII only applied in the United States. 13 It
further rejected a limited view of mixed-motives liability adopted in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.14 And it added a provision to supersede the Supreme
Court’s decision in Lorance v. AT&T Technologies15 that a neutral-appearing
seniority policy established with discriminatory effect had to be challenged
immediately.16 The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 was made necessary in
Congress’s view because the Supreme Court had “narrowed the broad scope of
protection intended to be afforded by the ADA, thus eliminating the protection
for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect.”17 Additionally, “as
a result of these Supreme Court cases, lower courts have incorrectly found in
individual cases that people with a range of substantially limiting impairments
are not people with disabilities.”18 Most recently, Congress enacted the Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, because:
[t]he Supreme Court in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co. . . . significantly impair[ed] statutory protections against discrimination in
compensation that Congress established and that have been bedrock
11 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012)); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 138−41 (1976);
see also Diana Kasdan, Note, Reclaiming Title VII and the PDA: Prohibiting Workplace
Discrimination Against Breastfeeding Women, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 309, 321−23 (2001)
(describing the legislation and the legislative history behind the PDA).
12 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2(2), 105 Stat. 1971, 1971
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
13 Id. § 109; EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 246–47 (1991).
14 Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107 (providing for liability but no damages relief if
protected status was a motivating factor in an employment decision but the same decision
would have been made without considering protected status); see also Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) (plurality opinion) (providing for a defense to liability
in a mixed motives case if the employer could prove it would have made the same decision
without considering protected status); id. at 260−61 (White, J., concurring) (arguing that
objective evidence should not be required); id. at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting
that causation analysis should be made compatible with the McDonnell Douglas burden
shifting framework).
15 Lorance v. AT&T Tech., 490 U.S. 900, 911−12 (1989).
16 Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 112 (“For purposes of this section, an unlawful
employment practice occurs . . . when the seniority system is adopted, when an individual
becomes subject to the seniority system, or when a person aggrieved is injured by the
application of the seniority system or provision of the system.”).
17 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(4), 122 Stat. 3553,
3553 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also id. §§ 2(a)(5), (b)
(describing the purpose of the Act).
18 Id. § 2(a)(6).
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principles of American law for decades. The Ledbetter decision undermine[d]
those statutory protections by unduly restricting the time period in which
victims of discrimination can challenge and recover for discriminatory
compensation decisions or other practices, contrary to the intent of
Congress . . . . The limitation imposed by the Court on the filing of
discriminatory compensation claims ignore[d] the reality of wage
discrimination and [was] at odds with the robust application of the civil rights
laws that Congress intended. 19

Individual Supreme Court Justices have also bemoaned the way the Court
has narrowed the scope of employment discrimination protections. There have
been a number of high profile dissents in discrimination cases making these
points,20 but most notable are recent calls by Justice Ginsburg for Congress to
step in. In her dissent to the Court’s decision in the Ledbetter case, Justice
Ginsburg stated that “the ball [was] in Congress’ court . . . to correct this
Court’s parsimonious reading of Title VII.”21 Justice Ginsburg has made
similar statements in additional cases. In Texas Southwestern Medical Center
v. Nasser, and Vance v. Ball State University, Justice Ginsburg concluded that
the two decisions warped congressional intent so badly that they should
“prompt yet another Civil Rights Restoration Act.” 22

III. THE TROUBLE WITH COURTS
The prior section touches on a pattern. Congress creates a discrimination
statute, over time the federal courts interpret it narrowly, Congress steps in to
counteract the narrowing, the courts interpret the amendments narrowly, and
Congress is called to step in again. One of the most appealing parts of
Professor Sperino’s suggestion is that it disrupts this pattern. First, it doesn’t
rely on Congress to act at a time when Congress seems incapable of acting 23
19 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 2(1)–(2), 123 Stat. 5, 5
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
20 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561−62 (2011)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 608−09 (2009) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701, 720 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
21 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 660−61 (2007) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
22 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2547 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); see also Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2466 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“The ball is once again in Congress' court to correct the error into which this
Court has fallen, and to restore the robust protections against workplace harassment the
Court weakens today.”).
23 Paul Kane, Little Time Left for Congress’s To-Do List, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2013,
at A2 (calling 2013 a record-low year for congressional action); David Welna, As Congress
Breaks, Inaction Remains Most Notable Action, NPR (Aug. 2, 2014, 8:29 AM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2014/08/02/337181198/as-congress-breaksinaction-remains-most-notable-action [http://perma.cc/L63L-A88E].
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and when congressional action does not seem to have the desired effect. 24
Second, it relies on the actors most likely to be able to make a change: the
lower courts, which hear vastly more cases than the Supreme Court with its
discretionary docket. And third, it advocates for change that the Supreme
Court has clearly opened the door to.
An additional virtue of this approach is that it does not get bogged down in
why the law has developed in the way it has. Starting there is a common
practice for reformers. In past efforts at reform, many scholars have focused
on why employment discrimination cases are different from other kinds of
cases as a way to suggest how Congress could change the law or courts should
change their practices. Some have posited that plaintiffs are unsuccessful
because of changes in employer behavior, labeling current forms of
discrimination “subtle” rather than “overt.” 25 Others have mapped doctrinal
drift between the goals of the statutes when they were initially enacted and
their current applications. 26 Still others have linked the drift and plaintiffs’
disproportional losses to the liberal use of summary judgment and the change
in rules to pleading standards under Twombly and Iqbal.27 Each of these
approaches has merit, but none has yet led to a solution. Focusing first and
foremost on a path forward is refreshing at the very least.
24 See, e.g., Hulteen, 556 U.S. at 717 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the

majority for subverting an amendment to Title VII); Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2541 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (“It is strange logic indeed to conclude that when Congress homed in on
retaliation and codified the proscription, as it did in Title VII, Congress meant protection
against that unlawful employment practice to have less force than the protection available
when the statute does not mention retaliation.”).
25 E.g., Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56
ALA. L. REV. 741, 749−51 (2005); Damon Ritenhouse, Where Title VII Stops: Exploring
Subtle Race Discrimination in the Workplace, 7 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 87, 87−88
(2013); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 469−89 (2001). But see generally Michael Selmi, Sex
Discrimination in the Nineties, Seventies Style: Case Studies in the Preservation of Male
Workplace Norms, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 1 (2005); Michael Selmi, Subtle
Discrimination: A Matter of Perspective Rather than Intent, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
657 (2003) (asserting that plenty of overt workplace discrimination persists).
26 E.g., Brian S. Clarke, A Better Route Through the Swamp: Causal Coherence in
Disparate Treatment Doctrine, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 723, 727 (2013); Erik J. Girvan &
Grace Deason, Social Science in Law: A Psychological Case for Abandoning the
“Discriminatory Motive” Under Title VII, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1057, 1060 (2013); Lynda
L. Arakawa & Michele Park Sonen, Note, Caught in the Backdraft: The Implications of
Ricci v. DeStefano on Voluntary Compliance and Title VII, 32 U. HAW. L. REV. 463, 464
(2010); Allison Cimpl-Wiemer, Comment, Ledbetter v. Goodyear: Letting the Air Out of
the Continuing Violations Doctrine?, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 355, 357 (2008).
27 E.g., Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. 95, 96−97 (2010);
Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for
Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1013−15; J. Scott Pritchard,
Comment, The Hidden Costs of Pleading Plausibility: Examining the Impact of Twombly
and Iqbal on Employment Discrimination Complaints and the EEOC’s Litigation and
Mediation Efforts, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 757, 774−79 (2011).
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The drawback to this particular way forward without looking at causes is
that it does not fully account for the way that lower courts are likely to act.
One explanation that few were willing to posit for the narrowing of
discrimination law was judicial animus towards those kinds of claims or other
incentives to be rid of them. But recent scholarship by a former federal court
judge suggests that animus and other incentives lie behind at least some of the
way that discrimination law develops – or fails to develop.
Nancy Gertner, a Senior Lecturer on Law at Harvard 28 and former United
States District Court Judge, has offered important new insights on why it is
that employment discrimination cases fare worse than other kinds of cases in
three recent articles. Her most recent article, The Judicial Repeal of the
Johnson/Kennedy Administration’s Signature Achievement, offers the most
developed explanation. She identifies five potential causes of the phenomenon:
1) judges may believe that discrimination doesn’t exist anymore;
2) more discrimination cases may be frivolous;
3) good cases may be taken to state courts because state law is less
employer friendly;
4) the Supreme Court may have narrowed the law in a way that protects
employers; and
5) the pressures on judges may create and perpetuate biases against these
cases.29
Based on her own experiences and others’ studies of judicial decisions,
Gertner concludes that ideology, particularly as communicated by the Supreme
Court in its decisions, plays some role. She concludes, though, that the greatest
causes of the narrowing come from the pressure on judges to manage their
caseloads and the ways that effects of those pressures magnify those
ideological factors. This article builds on two of Judge Gertner’s prior articles,
Losers’ Rules,30 and, “Only Procedural”: Thoughts on the Substantive Law
Dimensions of Preliminary Procedural Decisions in Employment
Discrimination Cases.31 The core contention in these three works revolves
around how case management practices are driving a wholesale abandonment
of the antidiscrimination project.
Judge Gertner describes two main drivers: asymmetrical processes in
issuing written decisions and overreliance on heuristics that are linked with
losing plaintiffs. First, judges are encouraged to resolve cases without trials
28 Judge Nancy Gertner (Ret.), HARV. L. SCH., http://www.law.harvard.edu/
faculty/directory/10303/Gertner [http://perma.cc/B3ZQ-UW5M].
29 Nancy Gertner, The Judicial Repeal of the Johnson/Kennedy Administration’s
Signature Achievement 2−4 (Mar. 9, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2406671 [http://perma.cc/R2R7-74PE].
30 See generally Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109 (2012),
http://yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1111_aau9fyvc.pdf [http://perma.cc/MC8X-MCEE].
31 See generally Elizabeth M. Schneider & Nancy Gertner, “Only Procedural”:
Thoughts on the Substantive Law Dimensions of Preliminary Procedural Decisions in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 767 (2012−2013).
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and to write decisions only when absolutely necessary. Because a grant of
dismissal or judgment disposes of at least part of a case, those decisions must
be written and must explain the decision’s rationale. So decisions are written
only when plaintiffs lose. 32 That means, the only decisions available to be read
by judges and litigants are decisions explaining what is wrong with plaintiffs’
cases, which creates and reinforces judges’ implicit biases about the merit of
employment discrimination cases. As Judge Gertner notes, “[i]f case after case
recites the facts that do not amount to discrimination, decisionmakers have a
hard time imagining the facts that comprise discrimination.” 33
Second, courts have developed decisionmaking heuristics for employment
discrimination cases which are employed in only one direction: to avoid false
positives—wrongful accusations of discrimination. Those heuristics become
precedent and then supplant the law themselves. 34 One particularly vivid
illustration of such a heuristic is the “stray remarks” doctrine, which trivializes
sexist and racist speech. 35 This doctrine arose as a way to distinguish direct
evidence of discriminatory motive from circumstantial evidence, with a
particularly narrow view of direct evidence. Only if no inference at all was
required to link the plaintiff’s protected class with the decision—e.g., I am not
hiring you because you are black or female—would the evidence be direct.
Anything else would be a “stray” remark. 36 This heuristic has been employed
in such a way that now, explicitly gendered or race-linked speech is not
considered evidence of discrimination or constitutive of harassment at all by
judges at the summary judgment stage. Conversely when juries hear that this
kind of language was used, they have ruled for plaintiffs and awarded large
damages. These awards suggest that those juries interpret this language not
only as evidence of discrimination or as constituting harassment, but also as an
indication that the discrimination or harassment is severe.37 Based on
development of heuristics like this one and in other ways, judges say that they
feel compelled by Supreme Court decisions and their own prior precedents to
rule in ever narrower ways. 38
Judge Gertner is not the only person with federal judicial experience
writing about how the system is broken for employment discrimination cases.
She is joined by Judge Mark W. Bennett, who has agreed that these structural
32 Gertner, supra note 29, at 4, 12; see also Gertner, supra note 31, at 110.
33 Gertner, supra note 29, at 13.
34 Judge Gertner is not alone in making this observation. Both Professor Sperino and

I, for example, have made similar claims. See, e.g., Marcia L. McCormick, The Allure and
Danger of Practicing Law as Taxonomy, 58 ARK. L. REV. 159, 160−61 (2005) (arguing
that the test developed in McDonnell Douglas had replaced the prohibition on
discrimination in Title VII); Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH.
L. REV. 69, 69 (2011) (arguing that frameworks used for analysis reduce the courts’ work
to rote sorting that squeezes out arguably cognizable claims) .
35 Gertner, supra note 29, at 3−4, 8−10.
36 Gertner, supra note 30, at 119−20.
37 Gertner, supra note 29, at 8.
38 Id. at 11−12; Gertner, supra note 30, at 109.
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pressures are having an effect, 39 and by Judge David F. Hamilton, who also
agrees and offers the Seventh Circuit’s standard as an antidote. 40 The work of
all three should signal that we ought to be concerned about the way
employment discrimination cases are treated by the judiciary, and that leaving
expansion of discrimination law up to judges might pose a problem.
I am also skeptical that the Supreme Court will take its own lead to expand
discrimination law to align it further with tort law or by using tort
methodology, either for its own purposes or to nudge the lower courts along.
There are circumstances where the Court has had to make clear that the lower
courts were interpreting the employment discrimination laws too narrowly. In
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, a unanimous Court had to reverse the
Fifth Circuit and make clear that plaintiffs did not have to provide additional
specific evidence of discriminatory motive if they could prove the reason
given by the employer was not worthy of belief.41 Similarly, in Desert Palace,
Inc. v. Costa, the Court had to explain that there was no special type of
evidence required for a plaintiff or defendant to use the mixed-motives
analytical structure. 42 These situations, though, have been relatively rare.
Much more common are actions by the Supreme Court to limit the reach
of discrimination law and to nudge lower courts in that direction. Some of
these actions are not obvious. A number of scholars have demonstrated in
different contexts how the Supreme Court has engaged in analytical sleights of
hand to resist broad interpretations of discrimination law.
For example, Sachin Pandya has shown how the Court has effectively
overruled prior precedent without acknowledging it is doing so through stealth
erosion.43 An example he gives is the way that the Court in Ricci v. DeStefano
likely overruled two cases holding that affirmative action was not
discrimination under Title VII by contravening four necessary implications of
the holdings in those cases.44 Another example of this phenomenon might be
present in the way that the Court used the rationale in Gross v. FBL Financial
Services to stealthily erode the holding from Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins that
“because of” did not require “but-for” causation, so that the Court could hold
39 Mark W. Bennet, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary Judgment”
Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment
Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 685, 697−701 (2012–2013).
40 Judge David F. Hamilton, On McDonnell Douglas and Convincing Mosaics:
Toward More Flexible Methods of Proof in Employment Discrimination Cases, Address to
the Association of American Law Schools, Section on Employment Discrimination Law
2013 Annual Meeting, in 17 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 195, 196−98 (2013).
41 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 149 (2000).
42 Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92 (2003).
43 Sachin S. Pandya, Detecting the Stealth Erosion of Precedent: Affirmative Action
After Ricci, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 285, 286−87 (2010).
44 Id. at 299 (arguing that the two cases affected were Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), and United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979)); see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
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that in fact it did require "but-for" causation in University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar.45
Deborah Widiss has documented a complementary type of sleight of
hand—the way that the Court reinvigorates precedent that has been overridden
by Congress.46 She used Gross to show how the Court had used an amendment
by Congress to one statute that overrode Supreme Court precedent as a reason
to interpret other related statutes as embodying that precedent. 47 Professor
Widiss also showed how Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. revived
Lorance v. AT&T Technologies despite the fact that the Civil Rights Act of
1991 had amended Title VII to nullify the effect of that decision. 48 In
additional examples, she explained how the lower courts also give life to
precedents overridden by Congress, creating splits and failing to give effect to
Congress’s language.49

IV. CONCLUSION
Based on this scholarly work, it is hard for me to see anything but a oneway ratchet in the judicial branch. The Supreme Court seems focused on using
doctrines only if they limit the reach of discrimination law, and the lower
courts magnify those inclinations because of judges’ own ideology about
discrimination law and the way that ideology is reinforced through judicial
practices. So while I agree wholeheartedly with Professor Sperino’s insights
into what it would mean for discrimination law if courts were to embrace tort
principles completely, I fear that her roadmap will not be followed.
That does not mean we should not try, however. No suggestions for
reform seem significantly more likely to be successful. Some of the other
suggestions for reform are worth highlighting here. It is frequently argued that
Congress should amend the discrimination laws to “fix” Supreme Court
decisions that interpret them narrowly. 50 Judges face structural pressures that
cause them to limit the substance of the law, and these pressures create a selfperpetuating spiral away from the goals of the employment discrimination
45 See Michael J. Zimmer, Hiding the Statute in Plain View: University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 14 NEV. L.J. 705, 716−17 (2014) (arguing that the
decision in Nassar undermined the approach in Gross by relying on it to interpret Title VII
based on the ADEA, when in Gross the Court had said it could not rely on Title VII to
interpret the ADEA).
46 See Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers:
Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 513
(2009) [hereinafter Widiss, Shadow Precedents]; Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining
Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV.
859, 860 (2012) [hereinafter Widiss, The Hydra Problem].
47 Widiss, The Hydra Problem, supra note 46, at 860−63.
48 Widiss, Shadow Precedent, supra note 46, at 542−46.
49 Id. at 546−56.
50 See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text (describing Justice Ginsburg’s calls
to Congress).
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statutes. To counter these pressures, Judge Gertner suggests that amendments
by Congress could use broader language that cabins judicial discretion. 51
Another suggestion along these lines, by Bill Corbett, urges Congress to stop
making patchwork amendments and instead thoroughly overhaul our statutory
approach to discrimination law.52
An alternative recommendation could be for more or different judicial
education. Scholars could monitor judicial decisions, like one study of
decisions from the Northern District of Georgia, showing that summary
judgment was granted for defendants on at least one issue in 95% of cases, in
an effort to reveal to judges their own patterns. 53 Seeing those patterns might
be a way to de-bias the judges’ anti-antidiscrimination-law attitudes.54 Judge
Gertner herself is currently undertaking a larger study like the Georgia one. 55
None of these recommendations is inconsistent with the approach
recommended by Professor Sperino, and in fact may complement it. Her
suggestions don’t rely solely on the courts, but also create opportunities for
litigants. Advocates who incorporate her arguments may see success in the
lower courts. Tort principles may actually have more traction than
amendments to Title VII which may incorporate principles less linked to the
common law. The fact that tort law is one of the law’s core subject matters
means that judges are likely quite comfortable with its principles and its
methodology. Moreover, there is a much larger body of law to draw on, law
that is shaped by remarkable consensus through the Restatement and state law
together. These factors suggest that exploiting the tortification of
discrimination law might be more fruitful than other routes for reform.
The only other discrimination- and litigation-specific recommendation for
reform that has been suggested is to consider an enforcement scheme that
doesn’t rely on the federal courts. 56 Judge Gertner suggested exploring
whether giving an agency staffed with subject matter experts who possess the

51 See Gertner, supra note 29, at 14.
52 William R. Corbett, Calling on Congress: Take a Page from Parliament’s

Playbook and Fix Employment Discrimination Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 135, 136
(2013).
53 See Gertner, supra note 29, at 14.
54 Judges appear to overestimate their freedom from biases, and a first step to
countering the effect of those biases is to have their existence demonstrated. See CHERYL
STAATS ET AL., K IRWAN INST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY, THE OHIO ST.
UNIV., STATE OF THE SCIENCE: IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW 2013, at 39−40, 53−54, 59−60
(2013), http://www.issuelab.org/resource/state_of_the_science_implicit_bias_review_2013
[http://perma.cc/Q7D2-6XNY].
55 Gertner, supra note 29, at 6.
56 See Samuel Estreicher & Zev J. Eigen, The Forum for Adjudication of Employment
Disputes, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
409, 417−18 (Cynthia L. Estlund & Michael L. Wachter eds., 2012) (advocating reforms
that would allow greater use of private alternative dispute resolution methods in
discrimination cases).
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power to adjudicate discrimination claims might be a better option. 57 I made
this suggestion a number of years ago, and have explored it in some depth. 58 In
my view, such an agency could better enforce the antisubordination goals of
Title VII, better balance employer and employee interests, provide greater
access to justice for low and medium wage employees, and better adapt to
changing norms of equality.
On the other hand, structuring an agency with such a large mandate and
staffing it to run efficiently is a daunting task, as is expecting Congress to
create something like this in the foreseeable future. Despite the appeal of an
agency model as an ideal, because of its impracticality, pursing that strategy
seems unwise. As an alternative in conjunction with other compatible reform
efforts, Professor Sperino's suggestion that the lower courts be pushed into
accepting other tort principles and tort methodology seems promising. I hope
they take her up on it in the ways that she suggests.

57 See Gertner, supra note 29, at 14.
58 Marcia L. McCormick, Federal Regulation and the Problem of Adjudication, 56

ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 39, 39 (2011); Marcia L. McCormick, The Truth Is Out There:
Revamping Federal Antidiscrimination Enforcement for the Twenty-First Century, 30
BERKELEY J. LABOR & EMP. L. 193, 195 (2009).

